Explore the causes for the defeat of the Republic during the Spanish Civil War (1936 – 1939)
The failure of an initial military coup
d’état by military rebels against the Second Spanish Republican Government
(1931-1939) developed into what is now known as the Spanish Civil War that
ended with the Nationalist victory of General Franco in 1939. Historians
Phillips, Jr and Phillips[1] both support the thinking that it was not immediately clear from the outset which side
had the better chance of success. One can analyze the reasons for the
Nationalist victory by comparing the weaknesses of the Republicans against
their strengths and analyzing to what extent the outcome was influenced by the
interference of foreign aid which many see as a decisive factor. While
recognizing the importance of economic affairs to the outcome of the Civil War,
given the restraints of the essay I have chosen to focus on the issue of
political and military unity which are more centrally relevant.
The Republicans were ideologically divided between their many
different constituent parts, leaving them vulnerable to defeat due to constant
“political infighting”[2] and
“domestic squabbles”.[3] These
internal dissidences were one of the party’s biggest weaknesses because it
meant that they were not unified in their goal towards overthrowing the
Nationalists. The Republicans were mainly compromised of communists, socialists
and anarchists who subscribed to widely different political ideologies. The
authority of the central government and their representatives in different provinces
was undermined by a multitude of different committees who did not necessarily
follow central Republican policies. These committees pursued their own personal
agenda which meant that priority was not given to a victory in the civil war.
The revolutionary extreme left, including but not limited to, the anarchosyndicalists
(FAI-CNT) sought to concentrate on a ‘social revolution’ much more than on the
war effort. Those in the Basque and Catalan regions sought autonomy from
central command and government by creating their own independent political
parties known as the PNV and PSUC respectively. In the Basque case, they often
ignored key revolutionary policies and pursued outright separatism and
attempted negotiation of their partition from Spain with foreign powers.[4] This
overall lack of political unity is exemplified by the four days of infighting
in Barcelona known as the ‘May Days’[5]
(1937) whereby the Communists (PCE) and Socialists (PSUC) were on one side
against the anarchists and POUM on the other. These deep political divisions
meant the Republicans were not entirely focused on the war effort which made
them weak.
Republican Spain lacked a cohesive
military strategy as a result of the constant political rivalry between
military forces, leading to their failure to launch a single, decisive battle against the
Nationalists. The Nationalists had essentially forced a ‘total war’ which meant
that effective centralization, deployment and mobilization of resources were
the only way in which they could ensure a victory, concepts which the
Republicans suffered with. There was no single military
commander due to the formation of independent militia’s in the first few
crucial weeks of the civil war who did not necessarily submit to a central
authority. They were organized on local rather than national levels which
made it difficult to co-ordinate large scale attacks. Those militias in the
Basque Provinces refused to relinquish their control over their armed patrols
and allow them to fight in different regions to their own. The conscription of
these militia forces into a single cohesive unit known as the ‘Popular Army’
happened relatively late in the civil war and was a slow process as a result of
their difficult nature. There was widespread recognition that collaboration
between different political and military parties was imperative to achieve a
military victory, a concept that was attained relatively easily by the
Nationalists and eluded the Republicans until the end.
The very nature of the Nationalist movement demanded a single,
disciplined command system which was one of the party’s greatest strengths. As
early as October 1936 Franco was elected as ‘single generalissimo’ where he
became Head of the State and commander-in-chief of the army in an effort to consolidate
military rule and give greater coherence to the Nationalist war effort. Later
on, Franco also became ‘caudillo’ of a religious crusade within the Civil War
with the blessing of the Catholic Church and leader of the only political party
allowed in Spain[6]
which consolidated his political as well as military supremacy. In April 1937
Franco created a one-party state called the Falange Espanola Tradicionalista de
las JONS (FET y de las JONS) which combined the two biggest Nationalists
parties of the Falangists and the Carlists together for better control and to
consolidate his support within them.[7] All
the different fractions were united under Franco which gave the Nationalists a
distinct advantage over the Republicans, although it was not the main factor
contributing to their victory.
Franco was skilled at balancing power between the many different
within the Nationalist party which was one of his greatest talents that allowed
him to ensure the continuation of a unified command. The merge of these two
parties also showed that there was a common consensus among the political
parties to put aside their differences in favour of working towards the one
common goal of victory.[8] These
numerous titles gave Franco absolute power over Spanish political life as a
fascist dictator while still representing all the different Nationalist
fractions. Every party was given enough leeway but never extreme over the
others. Thus, they all accepted that only under his rule would their interests
be safeguarded. He had received little opposition during the 1936 elections and
his subsequent rise to power, demonstrating the acceptance of his command from
other generals and political opponents. His prior achievements – leader of the
best army in Spain, the Army of Africa, and prominent international reputation-
already showed that he was a competent military and political leader. As a
result, Franco’s strong leadership skills were partially responsible in leading
the Nationalists to victory.
Many historians have claimed that
foreign aid played a crucial role in the Nationalists victory, rendering the
strengths and weaknesses of each party a secondary factor. The Spanish Civil
War was influenced by external circumstances that saw it become an
international crisis because it occurred in the politically tense atmosphere of
Europe on the eve of the Second World War, leading the international community
to simplify the events into a ‘black and white’ political struggle between the
binary opposites of Fascism, Communism and Democracy.[9] These conditions influenced other
countries interests and contributions towards the conflict, favouring the side
of the Nationalists over the Republicans.
The Non-Intervention Pact of 1936 was directly responsible for the
fall of the Republican side because it effectively confined them to
international isolation[10]
and placed the Republicans on an unequal military footing against the
Nationalists. The agreement ignored the flagrant violation of the rules by Nazi
Germany and Fascist Italy who blatantly sent foreign aid in support of the
Nationalists. The
lack of enforcement of the pact meant it became an active act of aggression on
behalf of the British and the French to deliberately not intervene rather than
a passive act of neutrality. Negrin’s government recognized the only way to
achieve a victory was by persuading the Allied powers to enforce the
Non-Intervention Pact or to abandon it altogether and give them military
equipment to defend themselves. The agreement was a “complete farce”[11] in regards to the Republic
because it was inherently biased against them and contributed so significantly
to their downfall.
Foreign
aid received from the Soviet Union to the Republic was limited in terms of
quality which further put them at a military disadvantage. The Non-Intervention
Pact pushed them into the arms of the Soviet Union and Stalin who were the only
country willing to provide consistent military aid throughout the civil war.
Rifles and guns provided were often in a bad state because they were old,
difficult to use and no match to modern technology of the time. The guns came
from a range of different time periods, from tsarist vintage guns to those used
in the First World War.[12] The bullets and casings for each
of these guns were all different and often came mixed together. It required
skill to learn how to distinguish between the right ones for each type of gun,
making the process of firing and loading slow and leading to a high number of
jammed guns on the battlefield. The PCE is widely credited for keeping the
resistance alive for as long as it did but it was not enough to ensure a
military victory on behalf of the Republicans.
In contrast, foreign aid received by the Nationalists was far
superior to that received by the Republicans who could not have hoped to defend
themselves against such overwhelming numbers of troops and modern military
equipment. Berlin formalized their air combat role with the Condor Legion which
dominated the air space from 1937 onwards. The Condor Legion included some of
the most advanced aircrafts at the time, the Luftwaffes, as well as the
necessary pilots and engineers needed to operate them. Although the Soviet
aircrafts given to the Republican side were modern by their standards, they
were soon out flown by these German aircrafts[13]
which highlights the disparity of foreign aid given to both sides. While
additional manpower was important, the Nationalists benefitted the most from
receiving modern technology. The Germans had airlifted the Franco’s army from
Morocco to mainland Spain at a vital moment of the conflict and without which
they would not have been able to even fight in the first place, demonstrating its
importance.
In terms of manpower Mussolini sent a fighting force to Spain in
numbers that swelled to 72 000[14] at
the end of the civil war which was another significant contribution that
allowed the Nationalists to further develop their military advantage. These
were well trained soldiers who knew how to fight and were paid in their country
of origin, making them an effective fighting force. Franco’s control over the
army was not compromised by these additional troops as he was allowed to remain
in control of his army throughout. After the Italians defeat at the battle of
Guadaljara, they were taken in under Spanish Command which suggests that
foreign aid did not interfere with the centralized control system of the
Nationalist party. There was no doubt that the purpose behind the foreign
intervention which aimed to ensure a Nationalist victory.
The consequences of the Non-Intervention Pact and the subsequent
imbalance of materials given to both sides suggest that foreign aid played an
undeniably major role in the outcome of the Spanish Civil War. The Axis powers
such as Germany and Italy were committed in their goal to achieve a right-wing,
fascist victory. Aid given to the Nationalists was of much better quality and
more consistent than that given to the Republicans by the Soviet Union in terms
of both manpower and modern technology. The Republicans failed to win not
because their policies were fundamentally flawed but rather because of the
strength of the international forces arrayed against it, combined with the
strong leadership skills of Franco who was able to effectively unify the
Nationalists under his command.
Bibliography:
Books:
Beevor, Antony, 'The Soviet Union and the Spanish Republic', in The Battle for Spain: The Spanish Civil War
1936-1939 (London: Hachette UK, 2012)
Casanova, Julián, The
Spanish Republic and Civil War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2010)
D. Phillips, Jr, William and Phillips, Carla, A Concise History of Spain, 2nd edn (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2016)
Esenwein, George, 'The Spanish Civil War', in Spanish History since 1808, ed. by José Junco and Adrian Shubert
(London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2005)
Graham, Helen, The Spanish
Civil War: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2005)
Payne, Stanley G. The
Spanish Civil War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012)
Salvado, Francisco, Twentieth-century
Spain: Politics and Society in Spain, 1898-1998: European History in
Perspective (London: Macmillan, 1999)
[1] William D. Phillips, Jr and Carla
Phillips, A Concise History of Spain,
2nd edn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), p. 338.
[2] Francisco
Salvado, Twentieth-century Spain:
Politics and Society in Spain, 1898-1998: European History in Perspective
(London: Macmillan, 1999), p. 114.
[3] Ibid, p.
114.
[4] Stanley G.
Payne, The Spanish Civil War
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 217.
[5] Ibid, p.
218.
[7] Phillips, Jr and Phillips, 2016,
p. 337-338.
[8] George
Esenwein, 'The Spanish Civil War', in
Spanish History since 1808, ed. by José Junco and Adrian Shubert (London:
Bloomsbury Publishing, 2005), p.241.
[9] Ibid, p. 237.
[10] Helen Graham,
The Spanish Civil War: A Very Short
Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 61.
[11] Julián
Casanova, The Spanish Republic and Civil
War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 216.
[12] Antony
Beevor, 'The Soviet Union and the Spanish Republic', in The Battle for Spain: The Spanish Civil War 1936-1939 (London:
Hachette UK, 2012).
[13] Ibid
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